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COMMENTS
State Prosecutions for Safety-Related
Crimes in the Workplace: Can D.A.'s
Succeed Where OSHA Failed?
INTRODUCTION
In 1983, Stefan Golab, a sixty-one-year-old immigrant worker,
died from inhaling cyanide fumes while working at the Film
Recovery Systems plant in suburban Chicago.' The working con-
ditions at the plant at the time of his death resembled an "in-
dustrial gas chamber." '2 The Occupational Safety and Health
\Administration (OSHA) issued a citation and fined Film Recovery
less than $5,000.3 However, the Cook County State's attorney
charged the company and its officials with criminal conduct.4 In
similar cases, corporate defendants have argued that the Occu-
pational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSH Act) preempts5
these state criminal prosecutions. 6
1 People v. O'Neil, No. 85-1853, slip. op. (Ill. App. docketed July 1, 1985).
2 Metz, Death by Oversight: Because OSHA Fails to Protect Workers, Local D.A. 's
are Hauling Employers Into Criminal Court, SrTruDE LAw., Sept. 1988, at 16.
Getting Away With Murder in the Workplace: OSHA's Nonuse of Criminal Pen-
alties for Safety Violations, H.R. REP. No. 1051, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1988).
4Id.
I Preemption doctrine is grounded in the supremacy clause of the Constitution, which
declares that "the Laws of the United States shall be the supreme Law of the Land."
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. Existing federal laws may preempt state action in the same field
in three ways. The first, express preemption, occurs where the federal statute explicitly
declares that it supercedes any state laws m the particular fields. The second, implied
preemption occurs where Congressional intent to preempt state law is inferred because the
scheme of federal regulation is so comprehensive that it is said to occupy the field, leaving
no room for state regulation. Implied preemption is applicable where a dominant federal
interest exists. Finally, preemption of state law occurs where there is a conflict that makes
compliance with both federal and state law practically impossible.
For a discussion of preemption principles and the OSH Act, see generally Note, mfra
note 6, at 540-53 and note 12.
6 See Note, Getting Away With Murder: Federal OSHA Preemption of State Criminal
Prosecutions for Industrial Accidents, 101 HARv. L. REv. 535 (1987).
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Debate on the preemption of state criminal prosecutions is
unsettled, but it appears that anti-preemption forces have gained
the advantage.7 Although OSHA has no formal position on the
issue8 and the Supreme Court recently declined to decide it,9
strong arguments against preemption have come from academi-
cians,' 0 Congress," the Justice Department, 2 and the high courts
of three major industrial states. 3
With the proliferation of state prosecutions for safety related
crimes in the workplace, questions regarding the prosecutions'
effectiveness and proper application become important. 14 This
Comment addresses the effectiveness of such criminal prosecu-
tions as a means of deterring safety-related crime in the workplace
and how such prosecutions can best effectuate this goal. Part I
See infra notes 48-66 and accompanying text.
I See Dockser, Michigan Court Rules Company Official Can Be Prosecuted in Em-
ployee's Death, WAL.I ST. J., July 12, 1989, § B, at 5 (OSHA spokesman declares that
agency still "ha[s] no formal position on the preemption issue").
9 Asta v. Illinois, -U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 52 (1989).
10 See supra note 6.
" See H.R. REP. No. 1051, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1988). This House Committee
on Government Relations report was based on a study completed by its Employment and
Housing Subcommittee. The Committee recommended that OSHA take the official position
that the OSH Act "does not preempt the use of histonc police powers by the State to
prosecute employers for acts against their employees that constitute crimes under State
law," and suggested that Congress increase the criminal penalties of the Act and strengthen
enforcement efforts. Id. at 5.
12 See infra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
" People v. Hegedus, 443 N.W.2d 127 (Mich. 1989) (allowing the prosecution of the
supervisor of an employee of Jackson Enterprises who died of carbon monoxide intoxication
while working in a company-owned van whose undercarriage and exhaust system were
deteriorated); People v. Chicago Magnet Wire Corp., 534 N.E.2d 962 (Ill. 1989), cert.
denied sub nom. Asta v. Illinois, - U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 52 (1989). The Illinois court
allowed the state to prosecute Chicago Magnet Wire Corporation and five of its officers
and agents on charges of aggravated battery and reckless conduct. The indictments charged
that the defendants unreasonably exposed 42 employees to "'poisonous and stupifying
substances' in the workplace and prevented the employees from protecting themselves by
'failing to provide necessary safety instructions and necessary safety equipment' " Id. at
963. People v. Pymm (C.A.N.Y. Oct. 16, 1990) (1990 WL 153774) (affirmng convictions
of corporate and individual defendants on charges, including assault and reckless endan-
germent, stemming from the unsafe operation of a mercury recovery operation by a
thermometer manufacturer and its maintenance corporation, which caused an employee to
suffer mercury poisoning).
4 These "safety-related" crimes include manslaughter, battery, and reckless conduct.
The crimmal actors are company managers and owners whose neglect of and disregard for
worker safety is such that it meets the mens rea requirements of criminal statutes.
Violation of these criminal statutes should not be confused with violation of the




presents the setting of the OSHA preemption debate.' 5 Part II
generally examines criminal prosecutions of corporations and in-
dividual corporate actors. 16 Part III discusses the desirability of
allowing state criminal prosecutions against individuals responsi-
ble for safety-related crimes in the workplace.' 7 Finally, this Com-
ment concludes that. criminal prosecutions, particularly those
involving incarceration, are effective means of deterring unsafe
conduct in the workplace and that the OSH Act was not intended
to preempt such state action.' 8
I. THE SETTiNo OF THE OSHA PREEMPTION DEBATE
A. OSHA
In 1970, Congress passed the OSH Act, 9 which formed a new
agency within the Department of Labor, whose purpose was to
regulate and enforce worksite safety standards? The Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) is the adnmmstrative
agency created "to assure so far as possible every working man
and woman m the Nation safe and healthful working conditions
and to preserve our human resources." 2' Congress gave the Secre-
tary of Labor the responsibility of establishing health and safety
standards for workplaces and gave OSHA the power to enforce
these standards through routine inspections and investigations. 2
" See infra notes 19-71 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 72-121 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 122-66 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 167-71 and accompanying text.
9 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1982).
2 Members of Congress expressed concern that the state regulations were inadequate
and underenforced. See, e.g., 116 CoNG. Rac. 37,628 (1970) (statement of Sen. Muskie)
("Only four States have adequate standards. Nowhere are enforcement mechanisms
and penalties adequate to force industry compliance with existing standards."), reprinted in
SuBcomm. ON LABOR OF THE SENATE CoM. ON LABOR AND PUBIC WELFE, 92D CONG.,
IsT SEss., LEGisArT E HISTORY OF THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFEY AND HEALTH ACT OF 1970,
at 513 (1971) [hereinafter LEoisLATV i HIsToRY]. Members of Congress repeatedly noted
that the United States has more game wardens than workplace health and safety inspectors.
See, e.g., id. at 38,387 (Statement of Rep. Gaydos) ("Elk and deer are better protected than
working men and women."), reprinted in LEGIsLATIVE HISTORY, supra at 1033.
23 Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1982).
- See 29 U.S.C. § 657 (1982). OSHA annually makes about 60,000 safety inspections.
See Fewer Federal OSHA Inspections in 1988 Due to Focus on Lengthier Health Inspections,
16 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) No. 49, at 1415 (May 13, 1987). The agency also inspects all
workplaces where a death occurs or where there is an accident resulting in the hospitalization
of five or more employees. See DmARm NT oF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH
AnaN., OSHA Fmw OPinATIoNs MANUAL 324 (1983).
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Violations2l discovered in these inspections can be punished with
abatement orders, civil penalties, or criminal sanctions. 24
This regulatory enforcement scheme is regarded by many as a
failure. 25 Indeed, OSHA has been criticized since its inception.2
Recent commentators propose a number of reasons for the failure,
including ineffective inspections and sanctions that are too weak
to deter unsafe conduct. 27 The criminal sanctions of the OSH Act
are frequent targets of this criticism.28
OSHA has authority to seek criminal'prosecution for workplace
violations in three situations: (1) the willful violation of a specific
OSHA standard, resulting in death to an employee, 29 (2) the giving
of advance notice of an OSHA inspection, 30 and (3) the knowing
falsification of statements or documents supplied to OSHA." How-
ever, OSHA has no independent power to prosecute and must refer
these cases to the Department of Justice for possible criminal
action.3 2 The criminal prosecution of these cases requires both the
recommendation of the Justice Department and the agreement of
the local U.S. attorney's office, which has ultimate responsibility
23 These may be violations of a specific OSHA regulation or of the general duty to
provide a workplace free from recognizable hazards. International Union v. General Dy-
namics Land Sys. Div., 815 F.2d 1570, 1575-76 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
. 29 U.S.C. §§ 658-59, 666 (1982). Abatement orders are admimstrative orders that
require a regulated party to abate, or cease, operations until a specified actior is taken.
Specified action usually includes the bringing of the activities of the regulated party into
conformity with admimstrative guidelines, such as making an unsafe worksite safe.
15 See generally Metz, supra note 2, at 13.
- For a discussion of criticisms of OSHA, see B. MniTz, OSHA. HISTORY, LAw AND
Poucy 339-53 (1984).
- Metz, supra note 2, at 13-15, 19; Note, supra note 6, at 539-40 nn.30-34.
Note, supra note 6, at 539-40. "Advocates of strong workplace safety regulation
have found the agency too weak." Id. at 539; see also Koprowicz, Corporate Criminal
Liability for Workplace Hazards: A Viable Option for Enforcing Workplace Safety?, 52
BRooIU.YN L. Ray. 183 (1986); Radin, Corporate Criminal Liability for Employee-endan-
gering Activities, 18 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 39, 63-67 (1983); see infra notes 29-37 and
accompanying text.
" As originally enacted, the maximum criminal penalty was a $10,000 fine plus six
months imprisonment. See 29 U.S.C. § 666(e) (1982). In 1984, Congress raised the monetary
penalties for all federal crimes. The maximum fine for a misdemeanor resulting m death is
now $250,000 for individuals and $500,000 for corporations. See 18 U.S.C. § 3623 (Supp.
III 1985). Although a top Justice Department official said that these fines would apply to
OSHA violations, see Safety Violations Resulting in Death Punishable by High Fines,
Official Says, 17 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) No. 12, 483 (Aug. 19, 1987), the issue remains
untested.
- 29 U.S.C. § 666(f) (1982) (maximum penalty is a $1,000 fine plus six months
imprisonment).
31 Id. § 666(g) (maximum penalty is a $10,000 fine plus six months imprisonment),
12 See H.R. REP. No. 100-1051, supra note 3, at 3.
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for prosecuting the case. 33 Since the establishment of OSHA in
1970, a mere forty-two cases have been referred to the Justice
Department for crinunal prosecution. 34 Only fourteen of those cases
were prosecuted, and only ten resulted in convictions. The ten
convictions carried punishments of fines or suspended sentences .3
In fact, no one has been incarcerated for a criminal violation of
the OSH Act.3 6 Because of the infrequency and ineptness of these
prosecutions, state and local law enforcement officials have started
using their police powers to prosecute company officials for know-
ing and reckless conduct resulting in death or injury in work-
places. 37
B. State Prosecutions and the Preemption Debate
Although state prosecutions for workplace safety crimes are
still relatively scarce, 38 they have been brought with "increasing
frequency" during the 1980'S,39 largely in response to the abysmal
performance of OSHA.40 A defense often raised in these cases
asserts that the state prosecutions are preempted by the OSH Act's
criminal provisions. 41
The high courts of Michigan, Illinois and New York, the only
high courts that have considered this issue, ruled that the OSH Act
does not preempt state criminal prosecutions of employers who
maintain hazardous worksites. 42 However, m Sabine Consolidated,
3 Id. at 3-4.
3" Id. at 4-5. See also Note, supra note 6, at 538.
" H.R. REP. No. 100-1051, supra note 3, at 4-5.
3 Id.
See infra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
3, But see Metz, Los Angeles Gets Results With Roll-Out Unit, SruMEr LAw., Sept.
1988, at 16. The Los Angeles County D.A.'s office assumes an active role in safety-related
prosecutions. The office's program, anchored by a 24-hour "roll-out unit" able to respond
to the scene of "traumatic occupational fatalities," investigated more than 80 workplaces
and caused about 12 cases to be prosecuted from the beginning of the program in 1985
until the publication of Metz's article m 1988.
19 See H.R. RaP. No. 100-1051, supra note 3, at 4.
40 See Note, supra note 6, at 540.
41 See generally Note, supra note 6 (concluding that state criminal prosecutions should
be permitted as a supplement to a stronger OSH Act).
42 People v. Hegedus, 443 N.W.2d 127 (Mich. 1989) (supervisor charged with mvol-
untary manslaughter for death of employee from carbon monoxide inhalation); People v.
Chicago Magnet Wire Corp., 534 N.E.2d 962 (Ill. 1989), cert. denied sub nom., Asta v.
Illinois, - U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 52 (1989) (corporation and five of its officers and
agents charged with aggravated battery and reckless conduct in unreasonably exposing
employees to poisonous substances); People v. Pymm, (C.A.N.Y. Oct. 16, 1990) (1990 WL
1990-91]
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Inc. v State,43 a Texas appellate court held that the OSH Act does
have preemptive effect in this kind of case.
The conflict in these cases, and thus the crux of the OSH Act
preemption issue, concerns the interpretation of Sections 1844 and
4(b)(4)4s of the Act. In Sabine," the Texas court found that these
sections should be read together, because Congress intended to
occupy entirely the field of workplace safety regulation. The court
further ruled that state criminal prosecutions effectively establish
new workplace safety standards, thus contravening Section 18. 47
Both People v Hegedus48 and People v Chicago Magnet Wire
Corp.49 refuted the "occupying the field" argument 0 by noting
153774) (two corporations and their two controlling officers convicted on five criminal
charges including first and second degree assault and reckless endangerment because of the
unsafe operation of a thermometer business).
43 756 S.W.2d 865 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988). Contra State ex rel. Cornellier v. Black, 425
N.W.2d 21 (V/is. App. 1988) (the state's "local interest" in protecting the public against
crime required a finding of a "compelling congressional direction" as a prerequisite to
preemption of state action and no such compelling direction was evident in the OSH Act);
People v. Pymm, 151 A.D.2d 133, 546 N.Y.S.2d 871 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (the Appellate
Division of the New York Supreme Court held that the state did not need the approval of
OSHA officials to criminally prosecute defendants for conduct that was regulated by the
OSH Act).
--29 U.S.C. § 667 (1982), which provides,
(a) Assertion of state standards in absence of applicable federal standards
Notlung in this chapter shall prevent any State agency or court from
asserting jurisdiction under State law over any occupational safety or health
issue with respect to which no standard is in effect under section 655 of this
title.
(b) Subnussion of State plan for Development and enforcement of State
standards to preempt applicable Federal standards
Any State which, at any time, desires to assume responsibility for devel-
opment and enforcement therein of occupational safety and health standards
relating to any occupational safety or health issue with respect to which a
Federal standard has been promulgated under section 655 of this title shall
submit a State plan for the development of such standards and their enforce-
ment.
-5 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(4) (1982), which provides,
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to supersede or in any manner
affect any workmen's compensation law or to enlarge or diminimsh or affect in
any other manner the common law or statutory rights, duties, or liabilities or
employers and employees under any law with respect to injuries, diseases, or
death of employees arising out of, or in the course of, employment.
46 Sabine Consolidated, Inc. v. State, 756 S.W.2d 865, 868 (rex. Ct. App. 1988).
47 Id.
" 443 N.W.2d at 127.
49 534 N.E.2d at 962.
" Note the difference in the interpretation of "fields." Compare Sabine, 756 S.W.2d
at 868 (the Texas court considers the field to be the overall regulation of workplace safety)
with d hicago Magnet Wire, 534 N.E.2d at 962 (the Supreme Court of Illinois considers it
to be the more narrow field of crumnal regulation of workplace safety).
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that since the regulation of criminal conduct is a field "traditionally
occupied by the States . '[w]e start with the assumption that the
histonc police powers of the States were not to be superseded by
the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress." ' 51 Neither court found such a purpose.52 The Chicago
Magnet Wire court proposed that the purpose of Section 18 was
to provide a nationwide floor of protection.53 In Hegedus, the
Michigan court pointed out that Section 18(a) preserves the state's
jurisdiction over issues for which no federal standard exists, and
allows states, under Section 18(b), to formulate their own standards
for workplace safety and health, subject to OSHA approval. 54 "The
act thus contemplates an active role by the states in all areas of
regulation. '" 5 The Hegedus court also cited Chicago Magnet Wire
as indicating Congress' intention that the OSH Act's criminal
penalties not be the only sanctions available for punishment of
egregious conduct that results in serious injuries or death to work-
ers. 56 Both Hegedus and Chicago Magnet Wire present thorough,
well-reasoned arguments against the preemption of state workplace
safety prosecutions by the OSH Act.
Recently, the United States Supreme Court declined to decide
this preemption issue by dismissing the appeal of Chicago Magnet
Wire5 7 thus clearing the way for more state criminal trials. 58 Since
the U.S. Supreme Court refused to consider the preemption ques-
tion and OSHA has not taken a formal position on the issue,59 the
permissibility of criminal workplace safety prosecutions must be
decided separately by the courts of each state. It appears the "anti-
S, Hegedus, 443 N.W.2d at 131; Chicago Magnet Wire, 534 N.E.2d at 966 (both
quoting Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977)).
11 Hegedus, 443 N.W.2d at 138; Chicago Magnet Wire, 534 N.E.2d at 970.
31 534 N.E.2d at 967; see also Metz, supra note 2, at 19 (quoting Jay Magnuson, an
Illinois prosecutor, "in my conversations m Washington D.C., with different committees m
Congress, it is clear that [Congress was] quite willing to say: All we want is a floor,
[on health and safety standards. The states] can have their own state plans, as long as they
meet the mmmum federal standard.").
-443 N.W.2d at 136.
" Id.
Id. at 137.
Asta v. Illinois, - U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 52, cert. denied, sub nom (1989).
" See Wermel, Justices Let States Prosecute Executives For Job Hazards Covered by
U.S. Law, WALL ST. J., Oct. 3, 1989, § A at 4 (Supreme Court's refusal to hear the appeal
means that "states are likely to step up safety-related prosecutions.").
$1 See Dockser, supra note 8, § B at 5.
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preemption" forces have the most momentum in these state court
decisions.60
In addition to the recent Hegedus, Chicago Magnet Wire, and
Pymm decisions from the high courts of Michigan, Illinois, and
New York 6' the Report of the House of Representatives' Committee
on Government Operations62 is likely to carry significant weight in
future court decisions. The report urges OSHA to take the official
position "that the Federal OSH Act, as written, does not preempt
the use of historic police powers by the States to prosecute em-
ployers for acts against their employees that constitute crimes under
State law "63 This report further contends that, "[n]othing in the
OSH Act or its legislative history suggests that Congress intended-
to shield employers from criminal liability in the workplace or to
preempt enforcement of state criminal laws of general application,
such as murder, manslaughter, and assault." 64
The Department of Justice, which is responsible for enforcing
the criminal sanctions of the OSH Act, responded to the report
with a letter to the chairman of the Committee. 65 Regarding the
preemptive effect of the criminal penalties of the OSH Act on state
criminal prosecutions of employers, the letter read, "it is our view
that no such general preemption was intended by Congress . we
see nothing in the OSH Act or its legislative history which indicates
that Congress intended to deprive employees of the protection
provided by State criminal laws of general applicability "66
In view of the holdings of Hegedus and Chicago Magnet Wire,67
the recommendations of the Committee on Government Operations 6s
and the Justice Department, 69 and the U.S. Supreme Court's refusal
to decide the issue,70 it appears that state crimnal prosecutions of
60 See supra notes 42-43. The cases holding that OSH Act has preemptive effect were
decided prior to the Miclugan and Illinois Supreme Court's rulings and before the issuance
of the report of the House of Representatives' Committee on Government Operations. The
most recent decision on the.preemption issue was the reversal of a New York Supreme
Court decision, so that the law of that state now permits state criminal prosecutions. People
v. Pymm, 546 N.Y.S.2d at 871.
61 See supra note 42.
62 H.R. REP. No. 100-1051, supra note 3, at 5.
6 Id.
,Id. at 9.
See Chicago Magnet Wire, 534 N.E.2d at 970.
6Id.
"7 See supra notes 42-56 and accompanying text.
" See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
69 See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
70 See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
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individual corporate actors, particularly employers, will continue
to increase. Yet, even if these prosecutions are legally permissible,
one must still consider their practical effectiveness and decide if
they are indeed a justifiable means of protecting the state's interest
in the safety of its citizens. 71
II. CORPORATE CRUNnAL PROSECUTIONS
The merits of criminal prosecutions of corporations and cor-
porate actors have been the subject of much critical discussion.72
The primary justification for these prosecutions is their deterrent
effect on subsequent corporate decision making. 73 This deterrence
is achieved through the use of two basic criminal penalties-fines
and incarceration-and through social sanctions, such as loss of
reputation among peers. 74 However, the effectiveness of these sanc-
tions has been criticized, particularly as applied to the corporate
entity.75 An overview of the debate concerning criminal prosecu-
tions in the corporate setting is necessary before examining the
particular application of criminal sanctions in unsafe workplace
prosecutions .76
A. The Corporation as Defendant
Corporations, which lack a physical body to incarcerate, only
recently became susceptible to criminal charges. 77 Corporations also
lack a mind able to form the mens rea required to commit a
crime.78 However, in 1909 the U.S. Supreme Court held that a
corporation could be criminally prosecuted in limited circum-
71 See infra notes 72-166 and accompanying text.
7 See, e.g., Note, Developments in the Law, Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate
Behavior Through Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARv. L. REv. 1227 (1979).
71 See generally W LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, HANDBOOK ON CRnmAL LAW § 1.5, at 22-
29 (2d ed. 1986).
" Comment, Criminal Sanctions for Corporate Illegality, 69 J. CmM. L. & CIUM-
NOLOGY 40, 49-50 (1978).
71 See infra notes 77-121 and accompanying text.
76 See infra notes 122-66 and accompanying text.
, See Radin, Corporate Crimmal Liability for Employee-endangering Activities, 18
COLuM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 39, 45-46 (1983); see generally Coffee, "No Soul to Damn: No
Body to Kick' An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79
MIcH. L. REv. 386 (1981).
71 See I U.S. NATIONAL Com ssIoN ON REFoRM OF FEDERAL CRnmNAL LAws, WoRxINo
PAPERS 184 (1970); G. Wmnuas, CRmINAL LAw § 279, at 856 (2d ed. 1961); Lee, Corporate
Criminal Liability, 28 Co/um. L. REv. 1, 6-7 (1928).
1990-911
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stances. 79 Currently, a corporation may be prosecuted for homicide
in some jurisdictions0 and held criminally liable for a variety of
culpable conduct, ranging from price-fixang to manslaughter."'
Although the mens rea element of a crime is now imputed to
the corporation through its agent, the historic dilemma created by
the lack of a corporate body that could be jailed remains problem-
atic. Incarceration, one of the major deterrent forces available to
prosecutors,8 2 cannot be applied against a corporation."3 The ab-
sence of incarceration as an available sanction obviously weakens
the overall deterrent effect of crmunal liability and puts the burden
of deterrence on financial penalties and social stigma.Y
The indirect sanction of social stigma is premised on the belief
that a corporation will be "shamed" into improving its conduct or
will alter its behavior to protect its public image. 5 Although this
premse is theoretically sound, its application is mostly ineffective.
Generally, only larger corporations have public images of enough
economic significance that fear of their damage will deter crimnmal
conduct. 6 The fact that most corporations are not large greatly
dinumshes the practical effectiveness of social stigma as a deterrent. s7
Financial penalties must carry the burden of making criminal
sanctions against corporations effective, but fies have failed.s The
failure can be attributed to the following three reasons: low fimes,89
the "deterrence trap," 9 and "overspill." 9'
7See New York Cent. R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481 (1909).
w See Comment, Corporate Criminal Liability for Homicide: Has the Fiction Been
Extended Too Far?, 4 J.L. & CoM. 95, 100-04 (1984) (the jurisdictions that allow prosecution
of a corporation for homcide include New York, New Jersey, and Kentucky).
8, Id.
82 See infra note 85.
13 See supra note 77.
See generally Fisse, Reconstructing Corporate Criminal Law: Deterrence, Retribu-
tion, Fault, and Sanctions, 56 S. CAT. L. Ra,. 1142; Note, supra note 72.
8 See Comment, supra note 74, at 50; Geis, Criminal Penalties for Corporate Cnrm-
inals, 8 Cau. L. BuLr. 377 (1972) (Geis concludes that criminal sanctions involving incar-
ceration are probably the most effective deterrent).
"The public image of concern is the image with consumers, who could allocate their
money away from the corporate bad actor. Small manufacturers generally do not expend
significant assets to foster consumer identification with their products. It is the large
corporation, which has an economically significant reputation with consumers, that is
adversely affected by a social stigma. See Maakestad, A Historical Survey of Corporate
Homicide in the United States, 69 ILL. B.J. 772, 773 (1981).
1" See infra note 141.
" See Geis, supra note 85, at 381.
9 See infra notes 92-100 and accompanying text.
90 See infra notes 101-05 and accompanying text.
1, See infra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
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Statutory fines have "exceedingly low" maximum limits, 92 and
even these low limits are seldom recommended by prosecutors and
rarely imposed by judges. 93 Indeed, many corporations view such
fines as license fees or an expected cost of doing business. 94 A now
famous example of the insignificance of corporate criminal fines
was calculated by Professor Geis using the amount levied against
General Electric in the 1961 settlement of price fixing charges
against the corporation. 95 He determined that the $437,500 fine
affected G.E. to the extent that a $3 parking fine would affect a
man with an annual income of $175,000. 96
Economic theory suggests that fines will have a deterrent effect
only if the "expected punishment cost" of the proscribed action
exceeds the expected benefit. 97 Unfortunately, fines are rarely high
enough to create a sufficient expected punishment cost.9 Two
widely recognized causes of low fines are the "deterrence-trap'' 99
and "overspill."' '
The "deterrence-trap" argument begins with the economic prn-
ciple that the expected punishment cost must exceed the expected
gain from the criminal behavior. 10' This "cost" is the fine, or
penalty, discounted by the risk of apprehension and conviction.'0
Professor Coffee gave the following example: "if the expected gain
were $1 million and the risk of apprehension were 25%, the penalty
would have to be raised to $4 million in order to make the expected
punishment cost equal the expected gain." 03 Obviously, a large
91 See Radin, supra note 77, at 56; see, e.g., supra notes 29-31 and accompanying
text.
93 Coffee, supra note 77, at 406.
9 See Note, Increasing Community Control Over Corporate Crime-A Problem in
the Law of Sanctions, 71 YAL L.J. 280, 287 (1961).
" Geis, supra note 85, at 381. The indictment covered almost $7 billion worth of
fixed pnces. See Note, supra note 94, at 287.
" Geis, supra note 85, at 381. The fine amounted to 0.1% of G.E.'s total profit and
0.3% of its net profit for the year. Coffee, supra note 77, at 405 n.60.
17 See generally R. PosNmR, EcoNoic ANiYsis op TH LAw § 7.2, at 357-62 (2d ed.
1977).
" See supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
"See infra notes 101-05 and accompanying text.
'00 See infra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
101 Koprowicz, Corporate Criminal Liability for Workplace Hazards: A Viable Option
for Enforcing Workplace Safety?, 52 BROOKLYN L. Ray. 183, 208 (1986) (citing Coffee,
supra note 77, at 407-08).
102 Id.
MI' Coffee, supra note 77, at 389.
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corporation with vast assets must fear a significant fine or it will
not be deterred. The amount of the fine must be enormous to
compensate for the low the risk of apprehension. 10 Hence comes
the "trap"-an adequate punishment cost cannot be set because it
will exceed the assets of the corporation. When the fine is larger
than the assets of the corporation the corporation will not be
deterred, since it does not expect that a court will force the com-
pany to cease operations, causing loss of employment for many
workers, simply because it cannot pay a fine. 05
The "overspill" problem also is concerned with the imposition
of a severe fine, or any fine, on the corporation. The concern,
however, is not that an amount cannot be determned, rather it is
that the cost of any fine against the corporation is passed through
the entity to innocent or less culpable members of society, including
shareholders, creditors, employees, and consumers. 16 Equity fines
have been suggested as a means to keep the cost within the cor-
poration, but such fines have not yet proven successful.1°7
The general ineffectiveness of criminal sanctions against the
corporate entity has not resulted in an abandonment of these
prosecutions. It does encourage the search for more effective means
of deterring criminal conduct in the corporate setting.
B. The Corporate Individual as Defendant
The deterrent effect of criminal stigmatization and financial sanc-
tions on corporate misconduct is weak. These weaknesses often are
offered as justifications for the need to deter individuals acting within
the corporation. °8 Individuals are more likely to be deterred by
,"4 This is so because "most corporate crimes seem highly concealable because
victims of many corporate crimes do not necessarily know of their injury," and because
of the terribly thin enforcement and inspection staffs of most regulatory agencies. Id. at
390.
" See generally Coffee, supra note 77; Note, supra note 94. But see Note, supra note
72, at 1365-68.
1i0 See Radin, supra note 77, at 53. When a severe fine is imposed on a corporation,
the cost is likely to be passed on to several groups. Shareholders suffer a loss on their
investment. Creditors face increased risk of forfeiture on their loans. Employees may lose
their jobs. Consumers may be forced to pay higher prices for the products of the corpo-
-ration.
,Id. at 54. Equity fines are enforced by ordening the guilty corporation to issue to
a fund equity shares with value equivalent to a specified cash fine. The victims of the
corporate misconduct are the beneficiaries of this independently administered fund. Since
the corporation's capital is not drained, the short-term burden is lessened and creditors and
employees are affected less. Id.
l0 Koprowicz, supra note 101, at 223.
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prosecutions because they can be incarcerated and have more to fear
from crminal stigmatization than the corporation.' 9
The vulnerability of corporate actors to criminal prosecutions has
been a contested issue.110 The development of corporate crimnnal
liability presented the question of whether individual corporate ac-
tors, previously liable,"' would remain subject to criminal prosecu-
tion. The U.S. Supreme Court, in United States v Dotterwiech,"
2
held that such prosecutions were allowed. In United States v. Park,",
the Court set the modem standard for the crmunal liability of
corporate officers: where corporate officers are m positions of au-
thority such that the acts constituting an offense are under their
direct supervision, they can be held liable for that offense. The Park
standard" 4 established that indirect actors, as well as direct actors,
are subject to criminal prosecution for corporate actions.
Although individual corporate actors are subject to criminal pro-
secutions, some commentators believe that such prosecutions are an
improper means of deterrence." 5 The arguments against prosecuting
the individual actor are typically based on the following factors: the
moral neutrality of the conduct," 6 difficulty in identifying the re-
sponsible individuals, 7 mdemnification of the individual by the cor-
poration," 8 the infrequent imposition of imprisonment as a sanction
against executives acting within their corporate role,"9 and constitu-
tionally protected procedural rights of the individual.120
119 See infra notes 163-64 and accompanying text.
11o For a brief discussion of the history of the individual corporate officer or manager
as a defendant, see Von Ebers, The Application of Criminal Homicide Statutes to Work-
Related Deaths: Mens Rea and Deterrence, 1986 U. ILL. L.F 980, 980-81. For a more in-
depth review, see Note, supra note 72, at 1259-75.
" See Von Ebers, supra note 110, at 980.
112 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
11 421 U.S. 658 (1975) (president of a large national food store chain was convicted
of causing the adulteration of food).
114 mhe Government establishes a prima facie case when it introduces evidence
sufficient to warrant a finding by the trier of facts that the defendant had,
by reason of his position in the corporation, responsibility and authority either
to prevent in the first instances, or promptly to correct, the violation com-
plained of, and that he failed to do so.
United States v. Park, 421 U.S. at 658, 673-74 (1975).
" See Radin, supra note 77, at 57-59; see generally Mukatis and Brinkman, Managerial
Liability for Health, Safety and Environmental Crime: A Review and Suggested Approach
to the Problem, 25 AM. Bus. L.J. 323 (1987).
126 See infra notes 125-35 and accompanying text.
227 See infra notes 136-44 and accompanying text.
"I See infra note 145 and accompanying text.
229 See infra notes 146-51 and accompanying text.
2 See infra notes 152-57 and accompanying text.
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The importance and relative strength of these factors vary ac-
cording to the particular type. of crmunal charge. 121 Since this Com-
ment is concerned with prosecutions for crimunal conduct causing
deaths or injunes in the workplace, the factors underlying the pro-
pfiety of individual prosecutions for corporate misconduct are dis-
cussed in the context of unsafe workplaces.
III. CRuiMAL PROSECUTIONS FOR WORKPLACE SAFETY CRIMES
While recognizing the existence of arguments against criminal
prosecutions of individual corporate actors,'2 this section exposes the
invalidity of the reasons advanced in opposition to individual pro-
secutions for workplace safety cnmes'23 and shows why these prose-
cutions are proper deterrents to individual corporate actors. 124
A. Arguments Against the Prosecution of Individuals for Workplace
Safety Crimes
1. Moral Neutrality
Moral neutrality is based on the lack of any clear correlation
between what is commercially acceptable and what is legally, or
socially, acceptable behavior.12s "[W]hen [businessmen] violate the
law, they do not conceive of themselves as criminals businessmen
fight whenever words that tend to break down this rationalization
are used."26 Some activities, such as price-fixing and bribery of
foreign officials, are well-established and acceptable in the conven-
tional busmessperson's "moral code." 127 Additionally, the problem
is not limited to the perspective of corporate managers and officers.
"2 For example, moral blameworthiness is clearer when an employer creates extremely
hazardous working conditions that cause the death of an employee than when a corporate
accountant embezzles funds.
'1 See Radin, supra note 77, at 51-59. These arguments include the morally neutral
nature of the offense, the problem of identifying the culpable actors, indemnfication, the
hesitancy of judges to impose incarceration in these cases, and constitutional concerns.
'2 See infra notes 125-57 and accompanying text.
,24 See infra notes 158-66 and accompanying text.
225 Comment, supra note 74, at 41. There is no clear code of ethics for businessmen,
but increased emphasis on business ethics both in umversities and the business community
soon may provide a more certain direction.
126 Geis, supra note 85, at 383 (citing SuTHERLAND, Win= CoLLAR CknUM 225, 222
(1949)).
I" See Comment, supra note 74, at 41 (such activities are not considered sufficiently
outrageous to warrant harsh cnminal sanctions).
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Judges and juries often are reluctant to convict someone for criminal
conduct for the benefit of his corporation. 12s For example, many
judges refuse to consider price-fixing to be immoral conduct if it is
not accompanied by threats or coercon. 2 9 Similarly, juries in joint
trials frequently acquit individual defendants while convicting the
corporation.30 Professor Herbert Packer suggests that such acquittals
result from corporate criminal behavior failing "to excite the neces-
sary sense of indignation and outrage that it takes for criminal
sanctions to be unsparingly applied."''
Since the criminal behavior leading to unsafe workplace prose-
cutions rarely will fail to be reprehensible,'3 2 the issue of moral
neutrality will be problematic only in exceptional cases.' Generally,
criminal prosecutions for worksite crimes are instituted by the state
only in egregious situations.1M When the reprehensible conduct in-
volved m these cases is presented in court, the jury will feel that the
individual has violated a public trust that white-collar workers owe,
a violation that requires severe punishment.135
2. Identifying Culpable Individuals
Prosecutors admit that a difficult problem in bringing a criminal
indictment in the corporate setting is determining who is responsi-
ble. 36 Large corporations often are able to shield the identity of
In Id. at 42.
2 Id.
I See, e.g., Pevely Dairy Co. v. United States, 178 F.2d 363, 370-71 (8th Cir. 1949),
cert. denied, 339 U.S. 942 (1950) ("the verdict of not guilty as to the indiwdual defendants
certainly stripped the verdict of guilty as to the corporation defendants of all semblance
of logic or reason."); United States v. Austin-Bagley Corp., 31 F.2d 229, 233 (2d Cir. 1929)
("how an intelligent jury could have acquitted any of the defendants we cannot conceive").
" H. PACKER, TiE Lmrms oF Tm CRMNAL SANCToN 359 (1968). Packer did not
reject the use of the criminal sanction in the "common regulatory sphere." However, he
did suggest that the sanction would have to be expanded m scope if a better correlation
between pumshment and crime is to be realized. Id. at 362, reprinted in Comment, supra
note 74, at 42 n.14.
132 All should agree that it is morally deplorable for an employer to endanger the life
or health of an employee with such scienter as is typically required by criminal statutes.
3 Local prosecutors generally get information about the unsafe worksite only after
the conditions have caused an.employee to be seriously injured or killed.
13, Comment, supra note 74, at 44 (this is due to criminal sanction's ancillary position
to other sanctions such as civil penalties).
II Id. at 43; Gels, supra note 85, at 381.
"3 See Koprowicz, supra note 101, at 223-24.
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culpable actors. 137 The corporate hierarchy obscures the identity of
the real actors and presents a paradoxical inverse relationship between
knowledge and authority 138 The managers who usually work most
intimately with the workplace are in a worse position to effectuate
change m workplace policy than are policy-making corporate officers
who may seldom or never visit the worksite.139 In smaller corpora-
tions, this problem of identification is much less likely to be prob-
lematic because the controlling personnel are more frequently m the
workplace and their knowledge of the hazardous conditions is dem-
onstrated more easily 140
Since most corporations are not large, 41 prosecutors usually should
be able to identify the responsible actors. Additionally, the employees
of larger corporations are more likely to have safe worksites due to
the influence of organized labor and the corporation's desire to
protect its public image.142 Finally, regardless of the size of the
corporate entity, the individual still must be proven to have either
directly committed the offense charged or have been in a position of
authority such that the acts constituting the offense were under his
direct supervision. 43 These factors combine to ensure protection of
the individual from unfair prosecution' 44 and suggest that prosecutors
generally will not be prevented from finding the culpable individuals
in the corporate setting.
3. Indemnification
The ability of corporations to indemnify their employees for
crmnal fines is often cited as a reason that such penalties are
"' MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07, comments at 150 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955) ("It may
be true that the complexities of organization characteristic of large corporate enterpnse at
times present real problems of identifying the guilty individual and establishing is criminal
liability.").
' See Koprowicz, supra note 101, at 224.
139 Id.
14 Id.
'14 Of 4,536,000 reporting business units for social security purposes, 3,929,000 em-
ployed 20 or fewer persons, while 505,000 more units had 20 to 99 employees. Only 101,000
businesses employed 100 or more employees. H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CoRo-
RATIONS AND OTHER BusiNEss ETrrEPisEs 694 (1983).
142 An attorney from the Los Angeles County D.A.'s OSHA unit noted that another
deterrent for larger corporations is having to tell the Securities and Exchange Commission
about a criminal action against them. See Metz, supra note 2, at 17.
143 United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975).
'I" But see Dunmire, A Misguided Approach to Worker Safety, 3 CiMui. JusT. 11, 13
(1988) (individual employees might be threatened with criminal indictment to get information
from them about the corporation or its officers).
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ineffective. 45 The logic is quite simple: if the individual does not fear
the punishment for a crime, he will not be deterred from committing
that crime. Tius reasoning is sound and demonstrates that mcarcera-
tion should be imposed on individual corporate criminals.
4. Infrequent Imposition of Imprisonment
Imprisonment, probably the most effective deterrent,146 is an
available sanction in nearly all statutes that provide criminal penalties
for corporate mdividuals. 147 Tis sanction is rarely imposed on the
individual corporate offender. 4 The OSH Act contains limited penal
provisions, which have never been used to incarcerate anyone con-
victed of crimmaly unsafe conduct in the workplace. 49
This gaping hole in the protection of the workplace is the essential
reason that state criminal prosecutions are mstigated. 50 These pro-
secutions are brought to punish individuals for particularly blame-
worthy behavior. 51 In such instances, the normal reluctance to impose
criminal sanctions should not exist. Indeed, it is obvious that pro-
secutions for workplace safety-related conduct will evoke substan-
tially greater feelings of reprehensibility from judges and juries than
actions involving other corporate crimes with less obvious and sym-
pathetic victims.
5. Constitutional Concerns
The individual rights of the corporate actor as a criminal defen-
dant are a source of some controversy Three rights of particular
concern are the fifth amendment privilege against self incrimination,
the fourth amendment prohibition of unreasonable search and sei-
zure, and the sixth amendment right to counsel and its inherent
attorney-client pnvilege.152 These privileges and protections are not
"I See generally Comment, supra note 74, at 49.
1' Id. at 50. One General Electnc executive who was involved in the 1961 heavy
electncal equipment pnce-fixing case later stated, "[t]hey would never get me to do it again
I would starve before I would do it again." Geis, supra note 85, at 379.
141 See Comment, supra note 74, at 50.
"48 See supra notes 128-31 and accompanying text.
141 See H.R. REP. No. 100-1051, supra note 3, at 4.
11 See Metz, supra note 2, at 13.
"I See Radin, supra note 77, at 68.
112 See generally Dunmire, supra note 144, at 44-45; Note, supra note 72, at 1276-93
(this Note provides an excellent discussion of constitutional concerns in corporate cnrminal
prosecutions). The fourth amendment concerns are generally addressed in regard to the
subpoena and inspection requirements of OSHA. The fifth amendment controversy involves
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extended to corporations and corporate employees to the same degree
that individuals enjoy them m ordinary crimnal cases.'53 The disputes
involving the sufficiency of the protections remaimng in corporate
criminal cases generally involve the production of documentary evi-
dence.154
The volume of documentary evidence is characteristically much
greater in corporate cases. 155 It is the reliable nature of this docu-
mentary evidence that justifies the lesser procedural protection af-
forded corporate individuals during their crimunal cases.Y5 6 Since the
documents involved in workplace safety cases are generally factual
records of safety measures taken by the company or injuries suffered
by employees, 57 the documentary evidence has significant probative
value and offers little chance of unfairly prejudicing the individual
defendant.
B. Arguments Supporting the Prosecution of Individuals for
Workplace Safety Crimes
The criminal provisions of the OSH Act and the current enforce-
ment efforts of OSHA provide no deterrent to employers violating
the use of safety and health records maintained by the regulated party in accordance with
the OSH Act. The attorney-client privilege dispute pertains to what types of commumcation
are protected.
"53 There is no fifth amendment privilege associated with corporate documents. See
United States v. John Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984); see also Craib v. Bulmash, 777 P.2d 1120
(Cal. 1989) (presents a thorough discussion of the issue, concluding that records reqmred
to be kept under California's OSH Act are not protected by the fifth amendment). In G.M.
Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 353 (1977), the Supreme Court held that a
corporation "by its special nature and voluntary existence, may open itself to intrusions
that would not be permissible in a purely private context." This holding limits the fourth
amendment protections that a corporation would enjoy concerning inspections by OSHA.
See Dunnure, supra note 144, at 45, citing G.M. Leasing, 429 U.S. at 338. Similarly, the
attorney-client privilege enjoyed by a corporation is limited. "The privilege is waived
whenever there is a voluntary disclosure of otherwise pnvileged information. Disclosure
made to corporate agents for a purpose other than the seeking of legal advice, for example,
to correct an unsafe condition, may constitute waiver of the privilege." Dunmire, supra
note 144, at 45.
'"' See Note, supra note 72, at 1276.
155 Id.
116 "Business documents, unlike extracted confessions or compelled testimony, are
notably reliable: both the regularity of recordkeeping and the exigencies of commercial life
ensure accuracy, and state compulsion, imposed only after the content of the documents
becomes fixed, will not distort the evidence." Id. at 1238.
"I One commentator suggests that the increasing number of prosecutions will cause
recordkeeping to be reduced to minmum legal requirements. Detailed records are essential
to epidemiology, making the connection between chemical exposure and disease, in the
safety and health field. Dunnmre, supra note 144, at 44.
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the statute. 8 Without an adequate deterrent, operators will continue
to create unreasonably dangerous but highly profitable conditions in
the workplace. 15 9 The state must take action to protect its citizens
from dangerous working conditions, since federal attempts at ensur-
ng a safe workplace have failed. 16°
The most effective means of deterrence available to the state is
the criunal law, particularly prosecutions against individual corpo-
rate actors that lead to jail terms.' 6' A tough sanction is needed to
compensate for the lack of moral pressure on the decisionmaker. 162
The possibility of incarceration will have a greater deterrent effect
than mere fines.
Incarceration not only involves the loss of personal liberty but
also entails a great stigma of wrongdoing.' 63 The corporate offender
is particularly vulnerable to reform by the threat of "demeaning
social sanctions" because he usually is a respected member of the
community and has greater concern for his reputation.' 64
State criminal prosecutions against the individual also have the
advantage of directly relating the culpability of the actor to the
penalty for his crie. 65 For example, a person acting with intent or
knowledge will be prosecuted under the particular state criminal
statute with that mental state as an element. Thus, intentional actors
will be punished more severely than reckless or negligent ones. By
imposing harsher penalties on those whose conduct is more repre-
hensible, the courts can create more significant deterrents to future
crime. 166
"I H.R. REP. No. 100-1051, supra note 3, at 4. A company official who willfully and
recklessly violates the OSH Act has a greater chance of winmng a state lottery than being
cnminally charged by OSHA.
" Von Ebers, supra note 110, at 995. The narrow cost-benefit analysis will continue
to be applied and profits in the face of low nsk will continue to win. See also Commonwealth
v. Godin, 371 N.E.2d 438, 443 (Mass. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 917 (1978) "The state
is the offended party where a death is caused by recklessness. To [not recogmze] the
purpose of cnrminal law [would] create a class of persons-[corporate actors]-as to
whom a license to kill by wanton and reckless conduct is given."
11 See supra notes 25-37 and accompanying text.
"I See Geis, supra note 85, at 377.
"6 Von Ebers, supra note 110, at 995. The logic here is that since the acts are morally
neutral, although harmful, there is need for some other kind of deterrence.
"I See Geis, supra note 85, at 380.
'6 Id.
1'6 See Von Ebers, supra note 110, at 995.




Although the purpose of the OSH Act of 1970 was to provide
"every working man and woman safe and healthful working
conditions,"167 it has failed, as evidenced by the number of industrial
accidents that continue to harm American workers. The states have
begun protecting their citizens by bringing criminal charges against
corporations and individuals who have acted with criminal mens rea
in the workplace. The corporate actors have responded to these
prosecutions with claims that they are preempted by the OSH Act.
It seems clear that Congress did not intend to preempt state
prosecutions when establishing OSHA, since the OSH Act's crim-
inal provisions are very limited and fail to address standards of
culpable conduct.' 68 The beneficial deterrent effect of state crim-
inal prosecutions far outweighs any concerns supporting the use
of the OSH Act as a preemptive shield. Recent state court deci-
sions are adopting this view and should continue to do so. OSHA
should take the official position that the OSH Act does not
preempt the use of the historic police powers of the state to
prosecute corporate actors for acts that constitute crimes under
state law 169
The state prosecutions are a proper means for deterring crim-
inally unsafe conduct in the workplace and for creating healthful
working conditions.' 70 The prosecutions have the most-deterrent
effect when individuals are indicted, since they can be incarcer-
ated, and they are most likely to be deterred by the social stigma
associated with a criminal conviction.1 7'
S. Douglas Jones
,6, 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1982). See also supra notes 19-37 and accompanying text.
,, See supra notes 44-66 and accompanying text.
"6 H.R. RP. No. 100-1051, supra note 3, at 5; see also supra note 11.
170 See supra notes 108-66 and accompanying text.
,7, See supra notes 158-66 and accompanying text.
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